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Neighborhood-representing organizations (NROs) are generally viewed as the most
authentic form of citizen participation and local democracy. In this article, I question
how democratic NROs actually are, both on the local level (participatory democracy)
and in the external arena (representative democracy). I present a new conceptual
model of the components of democracy in neighborhood organizations. A review
of the literature is presented within the context of this model to show to what extent
NROs are democratic. The findings indicate that the level of democracy in NROs
is questionable and that the "iron law of oligarchy" is valid for this type of organization.
The problem of low participatory and representative democracy is addressed, and
implications for research and practice are discussed.

Neighborhood-representing organizations (NROs) serve as a bridge
between the individual in private life and the large institutions of
public life. They mediate between the local residents and formal government and large service institutions.' The goal of an NRO is to
empower neighborhood residents, counteracting their feelings of powerlessness and lack of representation.2 As such, NROs are viewed
primarily as a means of representation that increases residents' awareness
and responds to their needs and priorities by allocating services and
goods. Emile Durkheim notes, "A nation can be maintained only if,
between the state and the individual, there is intercalated a whole
series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract
them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way,
into the general torrent of social life."3
Social Service Review (December 1991).
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The tradition of emphasizing the role of the citizen as an active
member of his or her community was introduced into social work in
the beginning of this century as part of the settlement house movement
and by the Charity Organization Societies' emphasis on neighborhood
work.4 According to this tradition, a key component of community
organization, neighborhood organizations of all kinds serve to prevent
governmental control and to promote local empowerment.5
According to Anthony Downs, there are two types of neighborhoodbased organizations whose purpose it is to improve the quality of life
for residents." The first type is any group, whether voluntary, public,
or for profit, that operates within a neighborhood and serves any
number of subgroups and their interests. This type may include civic
associations, community housing development corporations, co-ops,
and local alternative schools.7 Traditionally, these groups focus on a
single issue, and their constituency is limited to active members or
users, such as parents of children in an alternative school. In singlepurpose organizations, formal membership is often required, and, at
times, active membership is required to be able to benefit from the
collective goods.
The second type of neighborhood organization is an NRO. An NRO
is a local voluntary group managed by local residents that seeks to
represent all residents, regardless of their personal involvement.
Neighborhood-representative
organizations pressure government
agencies to be more accessible and more responsive to residents. Furthermore, NROs traditionally become involved in a variety of communal
issues. Mancur Olson described the function of voluntary organizations
as the provision of collective goods.8 In NROs, those who are not
official members and who may not contribute toward the collective
goods are nevertheless viewed as a constituency and are free to benefit
from these collective goods.
While the boundaries between these two forms of neighborhood
organizations are often blurred, there are major differences between
the two groups. For example, public access to the collective goods and
the community's ability to influence the organization may apply to
one but not to the other.9 In this article, I concentrate only on NROs.
There are no reliable data available on the total number of NROs
in the United States or abroad. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that
the number runs into the hundreds of thousands. Janice Perlman, for
example, reports some 10,000 block associations in New York City
alone, while the National Commission on Neighborhoods lists over
8,000 large neighborhood organizations of all types in the United
States.'0 Carl Milofsky, in a survey of neighborhood organizations,
found that 35 percent were advocacy oriented rather than service or
single-subject oriented, which indicates that about one-third of all
neighborhood organizations are NROs.11 In Scotland, there has been

616

Social Service Review

a coordinated campaign at the national level to establish NROs, while,
in Israel, local neighborhood committees (a type of NRO) have sprung
up in almost every urban neighborhood.12
There are two popular stances concerning the level of democracy
in NROs. Those taking the first stance believe that NROs are an ideal
example of democracy in action. Most proponents of neighborhoodbased organizations maintain that these organizations are the core of
democratic society.13 Those taking the second stance believe, based
on Robert Michels's famous "iron law of oligarchy," that even NROs
are, by nature, oligarchic. A third possible stance is that representation
in NROs is high while participation is low, or vice versa. This third
stance is a mix of the two extreme stances presented above. In this
article, I do not take the democratic basis of NROs as a given but,
rather, as a basis for inquiry. My purpose is not to challenge the
importance of democracy in NROs but, rather, to assess the extent to
which NROs are democratic.
A review of the literature on NROs shows that any mention of
democracy is usually confined to the overall description of the organizations. Those studies that did focus on the democratic functioning
of NROs had a narrow perspective and concentrated largely on a
limited number of organizations in one locale. Nowhere in the literature
is there a broad analysis of all the components conducive to the democratic functioning of a wide range of NROs. A substantial portion of
the literature on NROs is normative in nature, that is, what is ideally
expected, and there is little empirical data analyzing the level of democracy in NROs.
In this article I aim (1) to develop a model to define levels of democracy,
including both representative and participatory elements of democracy;
(2) to review case studies and research findings in the literature on
NROs and, based on the proposed model, assess their level of both
representative and participatory democracy; and (3) to assess the overall
level of democracy in NROs.

Defining Democracy in NROs
Many political and social scientists regard NROs as contributing to a
more democratic society. John L. McKnight claims that "the vital center
of democracy is the community of associations. Any person without
access to that forum is effectively denied citizenship."14 This valueladen approach has led to increased calls for greater citizen participation
and decentralization.15 Neighborhood-representative organizations are
seen as one way to achieve this participatory democracy. Participatory
democracy focuses on the extent to which an organization is open to
and incorporates all residents. This view applied to NROs would focus
on the organization's internal structure and relationships with its constituencies. 16
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Many modern political scientists, disillusioned by the concept of
participatory democracy, have found this form of democracy not only
impractical but also debilitating. Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl,
for example, define democracy, not as a process involving as many
people as possible, but as a way to arrive at political decisions by means
of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.17 The ordinary citizen,
then, is involved in the democratic process by determining who will
make decisions for him or her (representative democracy).
Thus far, I have described democracy as a two-dimensional concept
composed of participation and representation. In this article I propose
10 criteria, based in part on Hanna Pitkin, and Carl Milofsky and
Joyce Rothschild, by which to assess both the participatory and representative levels of democracy in NROs.18 Pitkin proposes a more
detailed model of democracy that focuses solely on representative
democracy. Her model distinguishes among four aspects of representative democracy: formal, descriptive, substantive, and actual representation. Although these categories are important and add to the
basic dichotomy mentioned above, Pitkin's model does not fully address
the broad aspects of democracy in neighborhood-based organizations
because it does not take into account participatory democracy.
Another attempt to measure democracy in neighborhood-based organizations, and one that can be also applied to NROs, was proposed
by Milofsky and Rothschild. They focused almost exclusively on issues
of participatory democracy. The key components of their model include
participation as democracy, voluntarism as democracy, donated resources as democracy, public meeting as democracy, and member
activism as democracy.
These two approaches, in combination, provide the following 10
criteria for democracy in NROs.
1. Free, open elections.--This criterion, which Pitkin labels "formal
representation," is the hallmark of all democratic societies and organizations. Without the open and honest election of officials, the power
in NROs will be held by those who appoint themselves and who care
only for their own interest. This criterion, which tests the level of
representative democracy in an NRO, overlaps with some aspects of
participatory democracy because it calls for active member participation.
It is important, therefore, to determine to what extent elections are
held and how many members participate.
2. Members'participation.--Another criterion of democracy in NROs
is the extent to which the general members are involved in planning
and policy-making.19 Organizations with an active membership are
characterized by open meetings, consensus decision making, and
members' participation in regular activities and decision-making bodies.
This criterion tests the level of participatory democracy.
-A third criterion to assess the level of de3. Informedmembership.
mocracy is the availability of information. It is imperative that officials
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of any democratic organization keep their members well informed,
especially on a local level where most people may know one another
and rumors are frequent.20 This is important for both representative
and participatorydemocracy. Residents cannot be involved in or demand
action from elected members of an NRO if they are not aware of what
the organization is doing.
4. Accountabilityto constituents.-A fourth criterion of democracy is
a high level of visibilityand accountability of the organization. Democratic
organizations and their officials must not only open their records to
the public, but they must also permit internal and external examinations
of accountability, planning, and accomplishments, including independent investigations and audits.
5. Due process.-A criterion of participatory democracy is due process,
which protects members against nepotism, injustices, and harassment.
Due process assures fair treatment and limits the power of authorities
in dealing with individuals. Accordingly, a democratic NRO must establish and publish clear procedures for action that citizens may follow.21
Examples include bylaws and protective procedures, such as grievance
procedures. In contrast, an NRO that has no written guidelines and
takes action arbitrarily based on the officials' interests can still function,
but it cannot be considered a participatory or representative democratic
organization. Rothschild and J. Allen Whitt note that alternative organizations, such as community health clinics or parent-run schools,
are characterized by minimally stipulated rules and primacy of ad hoc
individual decisions.22However, in alternative organizations, due process
is manifested by lengthy discussions in which all members are actively
participating and in which all members are protected.
6. Level of similarity.-A sixth criterion of representative democracy
is the level of similarity between elected officials and the constituency,
which Pitkin labels as "descriptive representation." Those who hold
office in NROs should resemble those whom they represent because
common characteristics often translate into equal interests.23 This assumption of equal interests may have originated, in part, from the
Marxist theory of class consciousness. If leaders and constituencies
belong to the same group, then it is likely that they share the same
problems and seek the same communal services and goods. If leaders
belong to a different group, then they will likely pursue services and
goods in their own self-interest and not those preferred by the majority
of residents.
7. Similarityin perceivedneeds.--This criterion of representative democracy was categorized by Pitkin as "substantive representation." She
argues that good representation entails not only similarityin background
but, most important, also a common perception by both leaders and
constituents of problems and their urgency. According to this criterion,
elected leaders are not to pursue their own private agenda but to
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represent the interests of all residents. This is especially important in
NROs where there is no real competition for office and incumbents
can easily become entrenched.
8. Cui bono?-This eighth criterion of democracy, based on Peter
Blau and Richard Scott's typology of organizations, asks who actually
benefits from the activity of the NRO.24 This criterion focuses on those
who derive a practical benefit (leaders alone or the whole community).
Cui bono is a more direct indicator of democratic representation than
the leaders' perceptions of problems or similarity in characteristics,
although it is more difficult to measure. According to Richard Rich,
it is hard to attract leaders without incentives, yet such incentives
increase the potential for conflict between members' interests in collective
goods and leaders' interests in maximizing the rewards of their roles.25
Robert Rosenbloom believes that because neighborhood organizations
are local and usually do not focus on social reform, leaders and active
members are largely motivated by the desire to preserve their own
property value and to improve their quality of life.26 Thus, a careful
analysis is required as to whose interests are being served and to what
extent leaders are self-serving.
9. Successful advocacy.-A ninth criterion of democratic NROs is
effectiveness in representing the needs and preferences of residents
vis-A-vis formal institutions. This criterion is, to some extent, parallel
to what is labeled by Pitkin as "actual representation." I distinguish
between the personal benefits of leaders (cui bono) and effective representation, although both are grouped by Pitkin as actual representation. The reason for this distinction is that, although some leaders
might not work for their own interests, there is also the possibility
that they might not work for the collective good but would give preference to the interests of government and other external public authorities.27 These governmental organizations could assimilate these
leaders and use them as a means of social control to prevent change.
10. Competitionamong NROs. -A final criterion of the level of democracy in NROs is competition. Competition by various NROs may
in itself be a positive process; however, it can weaken other democratic
processes. For example, if several NROs within one neighborhood
organize to carry out a particular mission, then they may impede one
another's progress, compete for the same resources, and unintentionally
weaken the neighborhood. Another example would be when representatives of different organizations compete for the same resources
for different causes and attempt to influence the same formal organization in their own favor. In the latter case, representatives of uppermiddle-class NROs are likely to be more effective because of their
stronger political ties, greater experience in lobbying, and greater
resources, thus reversing the representative democratic effect of NROs
in low-income neighborhoods.28 One can argue that such a network
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of NROs is the ideal form of democracy. However, competitive NROs
are likely to have a harmful effect and serve as a means for preventing
change and for perpetuating the current social order in the neighborhood.
In the remainder of this article, I will review data from various
studies that are relevant to these 10 criteria of democratic functioning.
Findings related to single-purpose organizations are excluded. A few
methodological limitations should be acknowledged. First, numerous
studies are used for this examination, some of which were conducted
outside the United States. The meaning and cultural contexts of NROs
in different countries may differ. Second, a neighborhood may have
more than one NRO; thus, some may represent the whole neighborhood
while others serve a certain subpopulation. Both types are included
in this study. Third, the NROs studied varied in size, scope of activities,
and history. Finally, the decision as to whether a certain local group
is an NRO is seldom clear. However, my findings are consistent across
this methodological variation and thus indicate strong validity.

Free, Open Elections
Free, open elections are the most common symbol of democracy and
thus are an important criterion in testing the level of democracy in
NROs. In Dayton, Ohio, even though the city mandated and supported
formal elections for NROs and mailed out ballots with stamped return
envelopes, only a small percentage of residents bothered to vote.29 In
a study of 11 NROs in Indianapolis, Rich determined that only a small
percentage of members had actually voted in the elections and that
officeholders in the NROs ran virtually uncontested in the elections.30
From a study of 20 NROs in Israel, Joseph Katan and I conclude that
most officials are either self-appointed or appointed by interested city
officials.31 Ruth Liron and Shimon Spiro, in a study of project renewal
in Israel, found that approximately 40 percent of the officials had
been appointed and that another third had volunteered.32 Although
it is often difficult for NROs to find residents who are willing to run
for office, those who do agree are almost invariably elected, and there
seldom is a real threat of being voted out of office.
Ibrahim Regab, Arthur Blum, and Michael Murphy report that in
Cleveland, Ohio, all the organizations they studied had been started
by a small group of residents who, upset by a critical incident in the
neighborhood, had decided to do something about it, which reflects
self-appointment.33 A similar phenomenon of self-appointment is reported by Terry Cooper in a case study in Los Angeles.34 Cooper notes
that, when the NRO became involved in a major planning effort, only
members who had the required skills remained active. Michael Masterson
reports that, in a government-proposed plan to establish neighborhood
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councils in Scotland, only 28 percent of the councils held a contested
election and that, overall, only about 15 percent of council residents
bothered to vote.35 As a result, councilors, to a large extent, selected
one another.
The overall trend from these studies is that the election of many
neighborhood officials is not entirely democratic. It may be the voluntary
nature of these offices and the attendant costs that make them unattractive to many residents. The lack of competition may contribute
to Pamela Oliver's findings that active participation is also based on
the belief that there is no one else to do the job.36 While such a motive
ensures some citizen involvement, it is insufficient to generate the
competition required for a true democratic election process.

Member Participation
In his Indianapolis study, Rich found that officers and a few activists
did almost all the work in NROs. Similarly, Katan and I report that,
in Israel, residents are rarely involved in NROs.37 Paul King and Orly
Hacohen discovered that, in Israel, even some officials took no active
part in the organization.38 To a great extent, the few officials who did
serve preferred not to be bothered by the dictates of the other residents.
Cooper reports that, the more successful an NRO becomes, the more
it tends to de-emphasize resident participation.39 He also notes that,
as issues become more technical and professional, the likelihood of
organizational stagnation and oligarchic decision making increases.
Curtis Ventriss and Robert Pecorella document the case of one organization that was able to avoid professionalization and maintain
close contacts with many residents.40 Nevertheless, it seems that in the
life cycle of NROs, professionalization and detachment from residents
is more the norm than the exception. Stephen McNamee and Kimberly
Swisher report that "the incomplete records and our own observations
at meetings indicate generally poor attendance at most priority board
meetings."4' Vincent Bolduc notes that, in most board meetings that
were open to all, only the board members participated and that, on
average, one new person attended every other meeting.42 Similarly,
Howard Hallman describes a case study in Columbus, Ohio, in which
attendance by residents gradually diminished and the executive council
became the dominant body.43Michael Lipsky and Margaret Levi studied
several NROs in poor communities and found that, because the leaders
had difficulty in defining what the rewards of membership might be,
local residents were not receptive to the organization, even though it
might serve them.44
The findings from these studies indicate a trend of minimal resident
participation. It may be that many officials in NROs recognize the
importance of residents' involvement but also view it as costly and as
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an unwelcome and added burden. This is especially true of older
NROs, in which the zeal of the start-up stage has passed.45

Keeping Members Informed
In a nationwide study, Curt Lamb discovered that nearly two-thirds
of the residents in black neighborhoods could not name even one
important local group.46 In his study, Rich found only very limited
contact between officers and members of the organizations.47 Even
when they could expect positive rewards from such contacts, leaders
failed to develop adequate networks with residents. Bolduc reports
that most of the residents surveyed in Hartford, Connecticut, could
not accurately describe any neighborhood association activities, even
though the association published a monthly neighborhood newspaper.48
According to Katan and me, and King and Hacohen, NROs in Israel
are not required to communicate with or report to local residents.49
They report that some organizations used one-to-one communication
as a method of reporting and very few mailed out reports or made
formal reports in a local newspaper, and then only on an irregular
basis. In all cases, the information was filtered by the leaders. Liron
and Spiro reveal that only 30 percent of the neighborhood residents
studied viewed the organization as representative and only 12 percent
knew an organization official by name.50 Finally, Matthew Crenson
studied the level of awareness of NROs by residents in six Baltimore
neighborhoods.51 He determined that only 40 percent knew of such
an organization in their neighborhood and were able to name it. This
study clearly indicates a level of detachment between NROs and residents, but further study is necessary to validate the findings.
This review of the literature suggests that the means used by NROs
to communicate with residents are varied, inadequate, and not entirely
democratic in nature. First, there are no clear guidelines as to what
information should be made public. Second, most of the methods
used by NROs to communicate with residents are informal and on an
ad hoc basis. Finally, for the most part, all information they provide
is censored and approved by the officials beforehand.

Accountability
Very few of the studies reviewed in this article mention any formal
internal or external form of evaluation or auditing. None of the studies
report employing a certified public accountant or other qualified
professionals as an independent auditor, and none use an external
means of evaluation. Furthermore, the studies did not report any
attempt at systematic evaluation from within. Interestingly, most studies
reviewed were initiated by the researchers, and officials of the NROs
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granted permission to the researcher to participate and record. Thus,
the officials, once elected or appointed, apparently had little or no
accountability to their constituencies.
One study explicitly deals with accountability. Patrick Sills, Hugh
Butcher, Patricia Collis, and Andrew Glen, in a study of five NROs
in their formative stage in England, note that those who initiated the
new NROs maintained leadership roles and were not accountable to
members and residents.52
In contrast, most studies of single-purpose organizations find high
levels of evaluation and auditing. For example, in a detailed analysis
of a civic organization in South Africa, Patricia Wheeldon reports the
use of auditing, and Milofsky and Sandra Elion cite the use of evaluation
in a local alternative school.53 It may be that organizations with specific,
service-oriented missions encourage careful review, while organizations
that are broadly representative tend not to emphasize accountability.
Due Process
McKnight, a strong proponent of NROs, asserts that such organizations
can respond quickly to residents' complaints because NROs are not
overly complex.54 There are no formal procedures in selecting an
issue and no institutional barriers to planning and taking action. Regardless of the benefits, the literature indicates that due process is
seldom found in NROs.
According to Rich, the "leadership cadre" of the NRO makes most
of the decisions regarding what projects to implement, how funds
should be raised, and what position to take on issues affecting the
community.55 This finding is supported also by Sills, Butcher, Collis,
and Glen's study of five NROs in England.56 Steven Haeberle studied
93 NROs in Birmingham, Alabama, over a 1-year period and found
that the number of meetings per association ranged from 0 to 16, with
a median of 7, although each association was required to meet once
each month." The leaders appeared to make most of the decisions
and plans in private with minimal regard for written procedures. Bolduc
notes that NRO leaders recognize their uncontested power but do
very little to change the situation.58 Katan and I indicate that none of
the NROs in Israel have bylaws that clearly state the rules on public
scrutiny or on the appeals process.59 King and Hacohen also disclose
that none of the NROs in their sample have grievance procedures.60
These findings indicate that NROs operate with little concern for
due process. Most NROs act according to the current leader or activist's
preferences and rarely commit to written bylaws. At times they reflect
the interests of a small cadre of leaders and active members at the
expense of other residents who have no established means to claim
their case.
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Similarity between Leaders and Members
Of all types of political participation, community leadership is strongly
and positively related to socioeconomic status."61This may be because
community leadership requires a high degree of professional skill and
communication capabilities.62 Downs finds that residents with the
greatest financial or emotional investment in the status quo are the
most active in NROs.63 Because those in power in many NROs prefer
only minimal change and strongly support conservative measures to
maintain the status quo, many of those who are extremely dissatisfied
with the current situation opt to move away from the neighborhood.
Sue Ann Allen found that, while 63 percent of the homes in East
Lansing, Michigan, were renter occupied, only 7 percent of the members
and 14 percent of the leaders in the NRO were renters, which reflects
a clear bias toward homeowners."64This does not imply that affluent
neighborhoods necessarily have more active NROs; rather, the leaders
in each neighborhood, regardless of its relative socioeconomic status,
tend to be those whose income and status is higher than that of other
residents. Abraham Wandersman, Paul Florin, Robert Friedmann,
and Ron Meier observe that, in both Israel and Nashville, Tennessee,
"rootedness" in the community is related to active participation in
NROs.65 "Rootedness" means living for a long period of time in the
area, intending to stay longer, having children, and owning a home.
Regab, Blum, and Murphy report that leaders have higher incomes
than members and other residents and are more likely to work in
professional or managerial occupations.66 This trend is borne out by
Bolduc's study in Hartford, Connecticut, Masterson's study in Scotland,
Sills and colleagues' study in England, and Yasumasa Kuroda's study
in Japan.67 This trend, with minimal variations, has held constant since
the early studies on personal characteristics of NRO leaders.68 Thus,
leaders in NROs can be clearly characterized as the neighborhood
elite.
The overall findings from the literature indicate that the leaders of
NROs are not democratically elected by the residents, operate in seclusion from other residents, are not accountable to residents, operate
according to their own interests and style rather than by due process,
and are not typical community members but the local elite. This profile
raises questions as to the match between the community needs of
leaders and residents. It also raises questions as to whom the leaders
are serving--themselves, their subgroup within the neighborhood, or
the neighborhood as a whole.

Similarity in Perceived Needs
Regab, Blum, and Murphy studied neighborhood needs as perceived
by leaders, members, and residents and found that leaders rated prob-
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lems as more severe than did members and residents.69 They found
a correlation between leaders and residents in the perception of problem
urgency of .42. They indicate that this correlation is high but fail to
account for chance agreement. If these considerations were taken into
account, the correlation would be quite low and would indicate differences in perception between activists and residents. Regab, Blum,
and Murphy also note that residents and leaders significantly disagree
on 40 percent of the issues, mostly in the area of housing and city
services. In a later paper on the same sample, Blum and Regab report
that, after a few years in office, leaders became more interested in
citywide issues than those of the neighborhood and residents lost
interest in the NROs.70
Crenson found a similar gap between residents and organizational
activists in six Baltimore neighborhoods.71 In Japan, Kuroda found
significant differences between leaders and residents with regard to
international attitudes, economic liberalism, taxes, and authoritarianism.72Cooper shows how an NRO, involved in carrying out a complex
mission of developing, obtaining formal approval, and carrying out a
large-scale housing project in the neighborhood, slowly divorces itself
from the perceived needs of many residents.73 According to Cooper,
dealing with complex formal organizations shifts the focus of NRO
officials from the needs of the residents to those of a technically oriented
group of professionals with whom they frequently interact. Thus,
officials gradually find it difficult to attend to the needs of the "uneducated" residents. Sills, Butcher, Collis, and Glen and Ventriss and
Pecorella show that the act of being attentive to residents' needs and
interests is slow, frustrating, and often discordant and can lead to
burnout for its unpaid, unrewarded workers.74
The overall trend that emerges from the studies reviewed is that,
over time, NROs become more professional and bureaucratic while
neglecting residents' concerns. Furthermore, long-term leaders become
impatient with residents and tend to prefer to work on what they
perceive as good for the residents rather than work with the residents,
which further widens the gap between the two groups' perceived needs.

Cui Bono
Theoretical literature like that of Rich and Olson assumes that personal
gains motivate some or all people who volunteer to be NRO leaders.75
With some exceptions, the literature does not seem to support a hypothesis that NRO leaders serve solely to benefit themselves; they
often function to serve the subgroup to which they belong. Robert
Whelman and Robert Dupont show how appointment of the local elite
to a task force to revive the New Orleans Zoo helped protect the
interests of affluent subgroups in the area.76 Allen found that in East
Lansing, Michigan, the positions taken by the association were largely
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those of homeowners (the majority in the association) and not those
of renters (the majority in the neighborhood).77 Bolduc's findings in
Hartford, Connecticut, reveal that most residents were unaware of
the two programs the NRO offered, which indicates a division between
leaders-beneficiaries and general residents.78
Rich and Katan and I argue that material rewards gained by leaders
in NROs are minimal.79 Similarly Wandersman, Florin, Friedmann,
and Meier find that the cost of participation-that is, donations, time
from work or family, and neighbors' requests-far exceeds any available
material rewards.80 These studies indicate that the major rewards for
leaders are the satisfaction generated by their activities and accomplishment within the NRO and that most leaders do not use their
position to improve their material status or to abuse their office. It
may be that these findings are biased by the limited accountability of
and challenge to leaders, and abuse of office may be more prevalent
than reported. The overall reported trend in the literature, however,
is that NRO leaders have more potential for benefiting neighborhood
subgroups than for personal gain.
Successful

Advocacy
Regab, Blum, and Murphy report limited congruence between the
problems perceived as most urgent by the residents and those on which
NROs actually concentrate.81 They explain this gap by noting that
residents stressed problems that had direct impact on the quality of
their daily life, while leaders sought a balance between immediate and
long-range problems. However, this gap may also indicate that leaders
adopt perspectives that are comparable to those of city officials.
Many studies of NROs indicate that after a stage of reform and
activism, both leaders and members co-opt into the formal organizations.
Instead of representing the interest of local residents, they begin to
assist external authorities in deliverng services or in obtaining relevant
data."2 These studies reveal that even the most contentious NROs,
those that manage to survive for more than a decade, eventually become
community service providers and neglect their earlier advocacy function.83 Katan and I found that very few NROs in Israel were involved
in advocacy or reform and that the majority either served formal
organizations or were inactive.84 Similarly, McNamee and Swisher
note that NROs in Dayton, Ohio, spend only 4 percent of their time
on planning or policy-making at the city or county level.85 Their main
interest is serving the city and county's need for local information and
preserving the NRO.
Again, the overall trend indicated in the literature is that, over time,
NRO leaders often disassociate themselves from local residents and
ally themselves with the formal institutions with which they commu-

Neighborhood Organizations

627

nicate. Once NROs become institutionalized,they either become coproducers of services for the local government or become inactive.
Thus, they abandon the reformist zeal and participatoryspirit that
led to and characterizetheir establishmentand the representativerole
for which they continue to exist.86

Competition among Organizations
The existenceof severalNROs,contraryto single-functionorganizations,
tends to weaken their individual power of representation.87A few
researchersreport hostilityand a loss of poweramong some competing
groups whose membersare often from differentethnic, racial,or social
groups.88The existence of NROs in every neighborhood perpetuates
class differences and serves to better the interestsof the upper middle
class.MichaelWilliamsnotes severalinstancesin which NROs, claiming
to represent residents, managed to keep blacksout of all-white areas
and to oppose orders to integrate schools.89McNamee and Swisher
revealthat the formationof NROsin upper-middle-class
neighborhoods
results in loss of power and resources in the nearly all black, innercity neighborhoods.90Poor neighborhoods cannot generate resources
and will often rely on funds from authoritiesor be co-opted in other
ways.91Due to problems in raisingfunds and hiring professionalstaff,
it seems evident that the poorer the neighborhood, the less powerful
the organizationwill be.
The above findingsindicatethat NROs,like any other socialstructure,
often serve to underminetheir own positiveintentions.When a number
of neighborhoods have NROs, the relative advantage for low socioeconomicneighborhoodsdisappears.Furthermore,competitionamong
local groups reduces their effectiveness as they fight over narrow interests. Competition also enables public officials to recruit these organizations for their own purposes.

Discussion
Leadersof NROs are usuallywell-intentionedresidentswho, concerned
by conditions in their neighborhood, decide to organize to improve
things. These leaders select methods in line with their experience and
values. In many instances, residents become leaders in a nondemocratic
manner, such as appointment by external organizations or self-appointment. Even those who are elected are elected by a few residents
and often face no real competition.
Because rewards for leadership are meager, few people wish to
become leaders, a fact that renders officers less vulnerable to the sanctions
of impeachment by residents.92 Furthermore, as is the case with most
leaders, these officials are usually at a higher socioeconomic level than
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are their constituencies. Uri Bronfenbrenner sees this as an indication
of representative democracy, in which the best and most able represent
the interests of all residents." However, it is also a sign of a low-level
participatory democracy in which full citizenship is limited to the elite.
Rich uses the exchange theory from a materialist perspective to
argue that leaders of NROs very seldom receive material rewards for
their efforts on behalf of the neighborhood.94 Because their rewards
are intrinsic, they do not need the other residents to be active in the
NRO. The leadership group establishes its own system of social exchanges, such as their periodic meetings over refreshments, that generates benefits that offset the cost of running the organization. This
increases the leaders' detachment from their constituencies.
Officials in NROs tend to create a small cadre of activists and to
exchange information within this select circle. As a result, most residents
are unaware of what is going on, except during the development and
conflict phases of the organization. In this respect, NROs, like many
other organizations, subscribe to Michels's "iron law of oligarchy"that is, all organizations develop small but highly centralized and bureaucratic bodies of leaders-the elite-who will necessarily compromise
democratic principles and keep most residents from participating and
electing new leaders.95
Some cities and national organizations have developed bylaws and
democratic procedures that NROs are expected to observe in their
day-to-day operation.96 Yet NROs are characterized by a high level of
flexibility and informality, which allows leaders to do as they wish.
There are very few, if any, mechanisms for control or accountability
to hinder officials of NROs.
Marlyn Gittle suggests that democratic citizen participation organizations may initially promote social change and adhere to participatory
democratic processes but that they tend to be absorbed by the very
institutional structures they had set out to change.97 Along the same
lines, Cooper argues that leadership demands technical and bureaucratic
skills that alienate the constituencies--a principal characteristic of the
"iron law of oligarchy."98 Thus, many NROs, which at the outset
involved residents in a democratic process, accommodate public authorities once they mature. When the social reform drive wanes, these
organizations become less active, more self-preserving, more controlled
by outside authorities, and less concerned with their democratic base.
John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, in an analysis of social movement
organizations, note that, to obtain needed external resources, organizations must meet the idiosyncratic preferences of those providing
the resources, the democratic nature of the organization is compromised,
and the survival of the organization becomes primary.99
Ventriss and Pecorella found one exception: a neighborhood organization that managed to remain accountable and close to its residents.100 They note that this effort was at the expense of attaining
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goals and required patient, dedicated leaders who wanted to educate
rather than achieve. The fact that this is the only exception reported
in the literature indicates that both participatory and representative
democracy are often compromised in NROs.

Conclusion
The major function of NROs is to moderate the power of complex
organizations that influence the local scene and to represent the needs
and preferences of local residents. However, a review of the literature
indicates a low level of both participatory and representative democracy
in NROs. From the representative point of view, NROs appear to be
a mechanism of social control used by local government and other
authorities. From the participatory point of view, NROs appear to be
potentially regressive and elitist groups. Thus, I raise the question as
to the overall desirability of NROs.
My analysis in this study focused on the actual functioning of NROs
from an atomistic framework. One may also view NROs from a holistic
perspective. In this respect, Williams notes that NROs can be, and
often are, reactionary, racist, and antiprogressive while, paradoxically,
serving other important functions in the neighborhoods.101For example,
NROs may assist in the individual and collective process of empowering
residents or changing attitudes. Such contributions are essential elements
in the democratic structure of any given society, and, though difficult
to measure, they should not be ignored. Furthermore, the NROs may
have an impact on how city planners and politicians regard the autonomy
and self-determination of the residents. Without NROs, apathy and
hopelessness might prevail on the neighborhood level, and city and
other authorities would be free to do as they pleased, without regard
to residents' needs and priorities. Neighborhood-representing organizations may have potentially decreased officials' paternalism. Finally,
the mere existence of a local NRO may add to the pride of residents
and their feeling of belonging even if they themselves are totally alienated
from the organization.'02 The level of democracy should not be the
only criterion by which NROs are measured. Indirect evidence as to
the importance of NROs is provided by Harry Boyte.103 Based on a
survey by the Christian Science Monitor in 1977, he reports that most
interviewees believed voluntary organizations were more active in
helping cities and neighborhoods than was government or big business.
These findings are in line with Constance Smith and Anne Freeman's
pluralistic thesis that voluntary organizations of all types contribute
to democracy in society as a whole, even if they themselves are not
necessarily democratic.104
It is quite possible that NROs are worthwhile and democratic only
when there is a real threat or common problem strong enough to
unite and excite the residents. In such cases, NROs serve the majority,
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are open to residents' input and participation, and are less subject to
the influence of the authorities. However, as time passes and the
common cause that united residents fades, NROs tend to become more
closed, less democratic, and weaker. As such, it is questionable whether
the existence of NROs is justified in the postreform stage. A better
alternative may be for residents and community organizers alike to
develop lively "ad hoc" NROs and to dismantle them once the goal
has been achieved. In this respect, enthusiasm and a higher level of
democracy will compensate for lack of experience and established
structures. However, like all organizations, survival may become the
primary goal in times of peace, and NROs do serve several positive
functions that would not be performed were they to be dismantled.
These include providing authorities with relevant information in the
interest of better services and assisting individual residents with problems.
My thesis in this article is that there is a discrepancy between the
potential and actual level of democracy in NROs. Before more conclusive
assertions can be made, research is required to assess the level of
democracy in NROs. These studies should also focus on practices that
increase levels of democracy in NROs. Finally, policymakers, neighborhood activists, and local officials should be more aware of these
issues and work in ways that will enable NROs to represent the neighborhood rather than the authorities or the leaders. The problem of
rewards for leaders is a crucial one.105Because the rewards of leadership
are minimal, very few wish to compete for office, and without the fear
of being unseated, leaders have no incentive for democratic performance
and need not be accountable. A more attractive reward system would
increase competition and increase the level of democracy in NROs.
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